Kant interpreters are divided on the question of whether determinate cognition plays a role in the harmony of the faculties in aesthetic judgement. I provide a 'non-cognitive' interpretation that allows Kant's statements regarding judgements of natural beauty to cohere such that determinate cognition need not be taken to perform any role in such judgements. I argue that, in aesthetic harmony, judgement privileges the free activity of the imagination over the cognizing function of the understanding for the purpose of unifying the object, although the free imagination cannot violate the obscure concepts and principles of ordinary common sense.
3
judgements. In determinate judgement, one subsumes a given particular under a cognitively available universal, say, 'human'. Conversely, in reflective judgement the attempt is to find a universal for a given particular (5: 179) . An aesthetic judgement is reflective because it is not 'grounded on any available concept of the object and does not furnish one ' (5: 190; CPJ 76) .
For Kant, judgements of natural beauty ('the tulip is beautiful') rather than judgements of art ('the painting is beautiful') form the paradigm case of 'pure' aesthetic judgement (5: 299) . These judgements are 'pure' because they are unsullied by theoretical, technical or moral interests.
Restricting ourselves to 'pure' aesthetic judgements, as I do in this essay, gives us the following overview of Kant's characterization of aesthetic judgement. 2 First, aesthetic judgement involves the 'form' of the object of intuition and not its 'matter'. For instance, a tulip is judged beautiful on the basis of its form, not its colour (5: 225) . Second, sensory pleasure is interested because it serves one of my ends, e.g. desire for cake. By contrast, aesthetic pleasure is disinterested: I take pleasure in the tulip although it does not fulfil any of my ends. Famously, Kant characterizes (aesthetic) pleasure in the tulip as purposiveness without purpose (5: 221) . Third, aesthetic judgements are intersubjectively valid. All human beings share the normative constraints of 'cognition in general'. Disagreement between them arises if they privilege their own private interests. In judging the tulip as beautiful, my private interests are not involved. Therefore, I
expect everyone to judge the tulip as beautiful (5: 211) . Fourth, in cognizing an object, the imagination must produce an image suitable for correct cognition, e.g. it should not provide a rope-image if the subject encounters snake-data. In aesthetic judgement, the imagination is free and 'schematizes without concepts ' (5: 287) . Fifth, the harmony between imagination and understanding in aesthetic judgement generates aesthetic pleasure for the judging subject (ibid.).
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Even a cursory look at Kant's doctrine of the harmony of the faculties in aesthetic judgement raises difficult questions regarding the role of the imagination and the part concepts play, given that determinate cognition is not the goal of aesthetic judgement. Paul Guyer frames the contemporary Anglo-American response to the puzzle of the 'free yet harmonious play of imagination and understanding' in a widely accepted manner (Guyer : 165, 2006a . 3 Guyer identifies three approaches to this puzzle: 'pre-cognitive', 'multi-cognitive' and 'metacognitive ' (2006b: 165) . The pre-cognitivists interpret Kant as 'claiming that in experiencing an object as beautiful we go through all the steps of normal cognition but are so struck by the unity of our experience of the object we simply stop short of applying any determinate concept to it' (Guyer 2006a: 315) . Guyer regards Dieter Henrich, Donald Crawford, Ralph Meerbote and his own early work (Guyer 1997) as taking this approach, and Hannah Ginsborg and Rudolf
Makkreel as variants (Guyer 2006b: 165-69) . On the other hand, the multi-cognitivists, Guyer says, 'have taken Kant to mean that in experiencing an object as beautiful the mind plays back and forth between a number of different conceptualizations for it without being forced to settle on any one of them' (Guyer 2006a: 315) . Gerhard Seel, Fred Rush, Henry Allison (who at least 'seems to be attracted primarily to the multi-cognitive interpretation'), and Malcolm Budd are multi-cognitivists (Guyer 2006b: 169-71) . The multi-cognitivism of Crowther (2010: 60-61n.) also belongs here. Guyer criticizes both these approaches for denying that determinate concepts are applied in aesthetic judgement (Guyer 2006a (Guyer : 315-16, 2006b . In opposition to them, Guyer outlines the meta-cognitive approach, in which cognition does take place, i.e. determinate concepts are applied, but the imagination harmonizes with the understanding in aesthetic judgement in a way that 'goes beyond' everyday cognition (Guyer 2006b: 183) . 4 
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In this essay, I will outline a reconstruction of Kant's theory of the harmony of the faculties consistent with the claim that determinate cognition plays no part in pure aesthetic judgement (henceforth 'new harmony theory' [NHT] ). I argue for this interpretation as follows. (a) Beauty, for Kant, is relational in that some natural objects and not others are 'suitable' for human cognitive faculties, i.e. conducive to aesthetic harmonization. Faced with such a 'suitable' form (tulip), the understanding attempts to cognize the tulip as it would any other object. This attempt yields a tulip-image-for-cognition. However, the determinate cognition of this tulip-image as 'tulip' does not occur, because the tulip-image-for-cognition triggers the imagination to create a free imaginative representation of its own in a way that neither violates the tulip-image-forcognition nor ordinary common sense. Judgement compares the tulip-image-for-cognition and the free imaginative representation of the tulip. Based on this comparison, it allows the human subject to apprehend the encountered tulip-data in the form of the free imaginative representation of the tulip instead of the form of the tulip-image-for cognition, thus giving the imagination primacy over the cognitive interests of the understanding in unifying the object-data at hand.
Apprehending the tulip-data in this free imaginative form ipso facto generates aesthetic pleasure, because it brings us relief from the perpetual conflict between the imagination and the understanding in determinate cognition. (b) If we accept (a), then aesthetic harmony need not include determinate cognition. The understanding constrains the imagination indirectly, because its attempt at cognition occasions an image-for-cognition that then both makes possible and constrains the free imaginative representation. In addition, the free imagination cannot violate the obscure concepts/principles of ordinary common sense.
In section 2 I enumerate the Kantian claims that must be accommodated in interpreting Kant's characterization of the harmony of the faculties. In section 3 I outline NHT and argue that it is 6 compatible with these claims. Finally in the conclusion, section 4, I draw out the implications of NHT for the question of how concepts are involved in aesthetic judgement, and identify my view as 'non-cognitive'.
Before I begin, some methodological considerations. First, since Kant's theory of the harmony of the faculties is insufficiently developed, my interpretation, like Zuckert's (2007: 17) , is reconstructive, and based on the principle of charity. I offer a theory that coheres with Kant's statements on pure aesthetic harmony, and to some extent discuss its phenomenological viability. 5 Second, my discussion restricts itself to CPJ, and does not refer to Kant's Nachlass.
Third, commentators have noted that Kant grounds his doctrine of aesthetic harmony in his outdated faculty psychology. On this count, I provisionally accept Zuckert's characterization of Kant's 'transcendental psychological language' as 'describ[ing] types of cognitive activity necessary for producing particular types of representation or experience ' (2007: 283) . Fourth, Ginsborg (1990: 46) points to the task of reconciling Kant's statements regarding harmonization of the faculties in aesthetic judgement with Kant's theory of cognition. The present essay is a preliminary step in addressing this larger question.
Harmony of the faculties in CPJ
The harmony of the faculties in aesthetic judgement involves 'conscious[ness] of a reciprocal (wechselseitig) subjective agreement (Übereinstimmung) of powers of cognition with each other' (5: 218). Imagination and understanding are the 'powers of cognition' here, and their harmony is achieved via the mediation of the power of judgement.
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Any interpretation of Kant's theory of aesthetic harmony must include the following loosely connected propositions.
(a) The notion of 'free play' marks the difference in the roles played by the faculties of imagination and understanding in aesthetic judgement, as compared to the roles they play in determinate cognition (5: 242) . In the latter, the imagination synthesizes sensible spatiotemporal data-bits for the correct predication of objects. If it provides a rope-image for snake-data, a snake cannot be cognized as 'snake', and so knowledge of objects cannot be gained. Conversely, in aesthetic judgement, the imagination is freed from the understanding's diktat to cognize (5: 241-42) . In this case, we are in a 'state of mind' in which imagination and understanding are in free play 'to the extent they harmonize (zusammenstimmen) with each other as required for cognition in general' (5: 217-18) . 'Free play' implies that no 'determinate concept limits them to a specific rule of cognition' (ibid.), which clarifies Kant's (5: 190) claim that aesthetic judgement is not 'grounded' in concepts, i.e. classification into a genus-species framework is not a precondition for judging beauty. Aesthetic judgement does not aim at concept formation either (5: 217).
(b) Aesthetic harmony entails that 'the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) [is subsumed] under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its lawfulness ' (5: 287; CPJ 168) . This differs from the subsumption of particular intuitions under particular concepts in cognition. (d) The imagination-understanding relationship can be considered 'merely subjectively, insofar as one helps or hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the state of mind…' (FI 20: 223; CPJ 25) . In aesthetic judgement, both imagination and understanding are 'enlivened' (Belebung) (5: 219) , and occur in a 'well-proportioned disposition (proportionirte Stimmung) that we require for all cognition' (ibid.). Aesthetic pleasure involves the 'reciprocal enlivening of the imagination in its freedom and the understanding in its lawfulness ' (5: 287, 291) , and arises when the imagination 'arouses' (erweckt) the understanding, and the understanding without employing concepts 'sets (versetzt) the imagination into rule-bound play' (5: 296).
2.2
Judgement plays a mediating role in harmonizing the imagination and the understanding in aesthetic judgement for the following reasons.
(a) The imagination cannot 'apprehend' the form of the object of intuition if reflective judgement, 'even if unintentionally', fails to compare this form to its own ability of relating intuitions to concepts (5: 190; CPJ 76) , which suggests that this imaginative apprehension can occur only if reflective judgement is in play. Since reflective judgement involves reflection, this statement is consistent with the claim that satisfaction in the beautiful depends on 'reflection' on the form of the object of intuition (5: 192; also 5: 204, 207, 209) . Similarly, Kant says that if the imagination (= faculty of intuitions) is 'brought into accord' with the understanding (= faculty of 9 concepts) via a comparison undertaken by reflective judgement, then aesthetic pleasure is produced (5: 190; CPJ 76) .
(b) Kant says: 'Now this merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which the object is given, precedes the pleasure in it, and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the faculties of cognition… ' (5: 218; CPJ 103) . In this passage, irrespective of whether and how judgement precedes pleasure, 6 judgement lies at the base of ('precedes') and enables ('grounds') pleasure in aesthetic harmony, which suggests that judgement plays a mediating role in producing aesthetic harmony. 
The Constitution of Aesthetic Harmony: An Interpretative Outline
In section 2 I enumerated the propositions constituting Kant's description of the harmony of the faculties in aesthetic judgement. I now offer an interpretation that can coherently accommodate these propositions. I will argue that when a human subject encounters certain forms of objects, the understanding initiates but does not complete the process of cognition. The intent to cognize, however, enables the formation of the image required for the process of cognition. This image triggers, at least under ideal conditions, the production of what I call an 'aesthetic image'; in turn, (aesthetic) reflective judgement permits the aesthetic image to give form to the encountered object-data, but without violating the obscure concepts/principles of the common understanding.
3.1
The beauty of an object is relational for Kant, i.e., it concerns the way in which the object relates to the cognitive powers of the human subject. More specifically, an object can be represented as beautiful if it is somehow 'suitable' for human cognition in general. Some objects are 'suitable' in a way that engenders the representation of beauty, while others are not. Therefore, beauty emerges in the relationship between the subject and the object. This claim is supported by a passage in which Kant says:
[T]his disposition of the cognitive powers has a different proportion depending on the difference of the objects that are given. Nevertheless, there must be one in which this inner relationship is optimal [zuträglichste] for the animation [Belebung] of both powers of the mind (the one through the other) with respect to cognition (of given objects) in general; and this disposition cannot be determined except through the feeling (not by concepts). CPJ 123) Here Kant seems to suggest that different objects bring about different configurations of 'cognition in general', or different relationships between the imagination and the understanding.
One can interpret this passage as follows. All images can potentially be cognized, i.e. located within a genus-species framework, and so are suited for cognition in general (= cognitively suitable). 7 Only some of these cognitively suitable images are also, in my terminology,
'aesthetically suitable', or suited to 'cognition in general' such that it is possible to perceive them as beautiful. Consequently, beauty is not merely subjective, or merely objective. It lies in the relationship between human subjectivity and a set of objects aesthetically suited to it, whatever such suitability or optimal animation might mean. As Fiona Hughes puts it, the 'harmony within the mind could not arise were there not at the same time a harmony between thing and mind' (Hughes 2010 (Hughes : 13-14, 2007 ). 
3.2
If the form of the object, here the tulip, is aesthetically suitable, it leads the imagination to produce freely an image of its own (henceforth 'aesthetic image'). Kant does not explicitly speak of an aesthetic image in CPJ. However, as I will show, positing an aesthetic image accounts for his statements regarding aesthetic harmony in CPJ. Kant says:
[I]f in the judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, then it is in the first instance taken not as reproductive, as subjected to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the authoress of freely produced image an occasion for the imagination to act freely? Second, the object is supposed to provide the imagination with a form which 'contains' the form the imagination would create if it were free, but within the limits of the understanding. Here, does the imagination actually apprehend a form in nature (= tulip-image) that it would have created itself were it free? Or should we read 'contain' to mean that the tulip-image is, in some sense, the outer limit, but includes within these limits ('contains') a form that the imagination would create if it could create freely? I argue, from (a)-(c), that the tulip-image forms the occasion for the imagination to produce an aesthetic image of the tulip, and that this aesthetic image is best interpreted as 'contained' (= limited) by the tulip-image.
(a) Two reasons can be cited for positing an aesthetic image. First, Kant distinguishes between the self-active productive imagination that generates 'freely produced forms of intuition'; and the reproductive synthesis of the imagination which is 'subject to the laws of association', and therefore not free to produce just any image for given data (tree shape for tulip-data, etc.) if cognition is to occur (2.1(a)). If the productive imagination in aesthetic judgement must freely compose (zusammensetzen) an image, then it could not be restricted merely to forming the tulipimage via the reproductive imagination. For, in reproductive image formation, the imagination is not free. Consequently, in aesthetic judgement, the productive imagination must create an image of its own (= aesthetic image) distinct from the image generated by the reproductive imagination.
Further, both the productive and the reproductive imaginations are involved in producing an image for the sake of cognition (henceforth 'cognitive image') (A118). The role of the productive imagination in aesthetic judgement must be distinct from its role in cognition. In the latter case, it must produce a tulip-image in the face of tulip-data to enable its correct conceptualization as a tulip, and therefore cannot act freely. However, if, as Kant says, it acts freely in aesthetic judgement, then it cannot merely create the tulip-image, for it could have 13 produced such an image even if it were not free. Thus, in aesthetic judgement, the productive imagination must create an image of its own, i.e. the aesthetic image, different from the cognitive image.
Second, in CPJ, Kant asserts at 5: 287 that the imagination 'schematizes without a concept' in aesthetic judgement. In contrast, in determinate cognition, the imagination schematizes with a concept: it produces a tulip-image for tulip-data, and thus enables cognition of the tulip. If the imagination schematizes, or images, without a concept in aesthetic judging, then the image it produces must be different from the image it would create if it were schematizing with a concept.
Therefore, we must posit a distinct image to accommodate Kant's claim that the imagination schematizes without a concept in pure aesthetic judgement.
(b) What is an aesthetic image, and how does it differ from the cognitive image? I argue that the occurrence of an aesthetically suitable cognitive image is a necessary condition for the formation of an aesthetic image. The aesthetic image must have a different genetic structure as compared to the cognitive image. Further, it must transform the elements of the cognitive image even if, as already suggested, it cannot violate its essential outline.
I have shown that, for Kant, beauty is relational (3.1), and the reproductively synthesized cognitive image is distinct from the aesthetic image (3.2[a] ). In addition, the cognitive image (schematized with concepts) must somehow 'contain' the aesthetic image (schematized without concepts) (5: 240-41) . How do these claims cohere with each other? It seems to me that the most natural course would be to say that the presence of certain aesthetically suitable forms, like the reproductively synthesized cognitive image of the tulip, trigger the imagination into freely producing the aesthetic image, but this aesthetic image must remain within, or limited to, the contours of the cognitive image of the tulip.
To begin with, how does the tulip-image 'trigger' the aesthetic image? One response might be that when I encounter an aesthetically suitable cognitive image (tulip-image), I instantaneously and subliminally give the tulip-image a 'second look', as it were, which allows the imagination freely to form an aesthetic image different from the cognitive image of the tulip. 10 Conceiving of the relationship between aesthetic image and cognitive image in this way also helps give some general content to the notion of aesthetic suitability. Kant says that we must 'try [each object] out' to ascertain which objects are aesthetically suitable, because this cannot be said a priori (5: 191) . If we accept that the cognitive image of an object occasions an aesthetic image only if its form is aesthetically suitable, then the criterion for such suitability is as follows. Those objects are aesthetically suitable whose cognitive image must occasion an aesthetic image under ideal conditions, that is, abstracted from all individual interests and emotions. This also implies that the formation of the cognitive image is necessary for the emergence of an aesthetic image in pure aesthetic judgement.
Further, an aesthetic image arises when the free (productive) imagination re-schematizes -forms a new image out of -an aesthetically suitable cognitive image (already a schema) in accordance with its own heart, as it were. Consistent with the Kantian framework, the aesthetic image can be distinguished from the cognitive image in two ways.
First, the aesthetic image and the cognitive image must have different genetic structures. An aesthetic image necessarily requires for its genesis that the human subject perceive, however obscurely, an aesthetically suitable cognitive image. However, the aesthetic image plays no part 15 in generating the cognitive image. To this extent, the aesthetic image and the cognitive image must be viewed as different sorts of images, which also indicates that the cognitive image can never become an aesthetic image if 'becoming' means intra-specific alteration (e.g. child to adult).
Second, if the free imagination cannot violate the contours of the cognitive image, then one can reasonably speculate that the activity of the imagination in re-schematizing a cognitive image into an aesthetic image would involve, at least in part, the accentuation and/or obscuration of cognitive image features -e.g. the aesthetic image may be an accentuation and/or obscuration of a subset of the combined features constituting the cognitive image of the rose.
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The following example might help make the process of formation of an aesthetic image intuitively more accessible. Suppose I see a grassless and craggy landscape which I do not find (a) If we accept that beauty is relational (3.1), and pure aesthetic judgement involves an aesthetic image triggered by the cognitive image, then the understanding in aesthetic judgement must make an initial attempt to cognize the object-data it encounters. This is because the cognitive image is produced for the sake of cognition (3.2) . If the understanding makes no effort to cognize, then the cognitive image would not arise. But the cognitive image must emerge for two reasons. First, if we are unable to distinguish between different cognitive images at any given moment (e.g. tulip-image from tumbleweed-image), then we cannot distinguish aesthetically suitable from aesthetically non-suitable object-forms, which means that either all or no objects are even potentially beautiful for us. This contradicts Kant's claim that only some objects are aesthetically suitable in the sense that they can be deemed beautiful if all the relevant conditions are fulfilled (3.1). Thus the cognitive image must be posited in aesthetic judgement. Second, I
argued in 3.2 that, at least under ideal conditions, an aesthetically suitable cognitive image triggers the aesthetic image; so there could be no aesthetic image without a cognitive image. I also argued that the aesthetic image must form part of the overall structure of aesthetic judgement. Therefore, a cognitive image must also be posited.
If a cognitive image is formed, then the understanding has either cognized or begun the process of cognizing an object. Even if the understanding does not actually cognize the object in aesthetic judgement -Kant does assert at 5: 217 that determinate cognition plays no role in aesthetic judgement -one can contend that the understanding attempts to cognize, i.e. begins the process of 'cognition in general'. One can justify this assumption on both textual and systematic grounds. Kant relates aesthetic judgement to 'cognition in general' (5: 217-18; section 2 above).
Since 'cognition in general' is not determinate cognition, but aesthetic judgement relates to the general process of cognition, and if, as I have argued, the cognitive image forms a constitutive part of aesthetic judgement, then the most natural way to make these propositions cohere is to say that the understanding must attempt to cognize in aesthetic judgement. This interpretation is, of course, consistent with Kant's claim that the understanding 'sets' the imagination into 'rulebound play' (section 2).
(b) Kant characterizes the 'free lawfulness of the understanding' as follows:
[O]nly a lawfulness without a law and subjective correspondence of the imagination to the understanding without an objective one-where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object-are consistent with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called purposiveness without an end) and with the peculiarity of a judgement of taste. CPJ 125) In this passage, Kant distinguishes the 'subjective correspondence' of the imagination and the understanding from the 'objective correspondence' between these faculties. Objective correspondence is the correspondence of these faculties in cognition, but Kant leaves subjective correspondence unexplained.
In my view, a passage from the Deduction discussing the subjective universality of aesthetic judgement can help clarify the notion of subjective correspondence. Kant says here that 'the proportion of these cognitive faculties that is required for taste is also requisite for the common and healthy understanding that one may presuppose in everyone' (5: ). This passage arguably not only elucidates how an aesthetic judgement can simultaneously be a perception, but also the temporality of aesthetic judgement. Suppose I encounter tulip-data, and form a cognitive image of the tulip at t0. This triggers the formation of an aesthetic image at t1. Judgement compares the cognitive image and the aesthetic image at t2. Finally, at t3, judgement allows the tulip-data to be organized and objectually apprehended in the configuration of the aesthetic image rather than in the form of the cognitive image. We notice this moment at t3 when the tulip-data has been ordered into an object in accordance with the aesthetic image, and we take pleasure in the object. In contrast, t1 and t2 remain unnoticed despite being necessary components of aesthetic judgement.
Second, the claim that judgement compares/privileges the aesthetic image over the cognitive image may seem incompatible with Kant's characterization of judgement as subsumption. But this is not the case. Unlike determinate judgement that subsumes a particular under an already given universal, aesthetic judgement subsumes the faculty of imagination under the faculty of understanding (5: 287). I argued that this subsumption entails that the aesthetic image, as product of the faculty of the imagination, can violate neither the cognitive image nor ordinary common sense, both of which relate to the faculty of the understanding (3.3) . This account of subsumption in aesthetic judgement is compatible with the following characterization of aesthetic judgement as comparison. Aesthetic judgement compares the aesthetic image and the cognitive image, and permits the former to determine the form of the given object-data. But it must accomplish this in such a way that the faculty of imagination is subsumed under the faculty of understanding, i.e.
keeping the aesthetic image within the essential contours of the cognitive image and the constraints of ordinary common sense. 
3.5
Having offered a reconstructive interpretation of aesthetic harmony (3.1-4), I consider some questions and objections with regard to it.
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First, Kant claims that imaginative apprehension of forms requires reflective judgement to compare these forms to its own faculty of 'relating intuitions to concepts ' (5: 190) . This could be read as saying that judgement must somehow precede the formation of the aesthetic image, which is at odds with my view that the aesthetic image emerges first, and is then permitted by judgement to unify the object. However, this statement at This passage can be interpreted as follows. Since human beings share the capacity for cognition, the cognitive image must be the same for everyone, and the same forms must be aesthetically 26 suitable for all. Upon encountering an aesthetically suitable cognitive image, the aesthetic image must be formed, at least under ideal conditions. The configuration of this aesthetic image must fall within a range across human beings, i.e. minor variations in the aesthetic image may occur-I may favour the whorls of the rose more than you, etc. However, under ideal conditions, i.e. if private interests are not in play, the aesthetic images formed in two people looking at the same rose cannot be diametrically opposed, because the aesthetic image cannot violate the limits of the cognitive image and ordinary common sense, both of which are intersubjectively valid. Lastly, since the modes of reflection and judgement are also commonly shared, aesthetic judgement in all human beings ought to privilege the aesthetic image over the cognitive image.
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In essence, human beings share all the structural features constituting an aesthetic judgement.
Therefore, if private interests have been set aside, all humans are entitled to expect that other humans will concur with them about the beauty of natural objects. Kant also says that aesthetic judgement and common understanding are intersubjectively valid in the same way (5: 292-93 ).
This seems right. I can merely demand that others judge the tulip as beautiful, but I cannot expect that they necessarily will. Similarly, I expect others to act in accordance with healthy common sense, but without assuming that they necessarily will.
Conclusion: A Non-cognitive Interpretation
In section 1, I noted Guyer's distinction between pre-cognitive, multi-cognitive and metacognitive interpretations of the harmony of the faculties in aesthetic judgement for Kant. In 
4.1
According to NHT, determinate cognition need not play any role in aesthetic judgement. All that is required is that the understanding attempt to cognize (3.3) . This claim makes textual and phenomenological sense. For Kant, cognitive knowledge is the primary task of the discursive intellect. Therefore, the understanding must approach all objects, including aesthetically suitable ones like tulips, with the intent to cognize. However, in the tulip case, once the cognitive image has been formed, the imagination is constituted such that it is prompted to create freely an aesthetic image without violating the cognitive image and the obscure concepts/principles of ordinary understanding. This leads judgement in aesthetic judgement to subordinate the cognitive interests of the understanding to the free play of the active imagination. Consequently, NHT
gives determinate cognition no role to play in the makeup of aesthetic judgement. Concepts are relevant only to the extent that the aesthetic image cannot violate the obscure concepts/principles of ordinary common sense. 
4.2
Pre-cognitivists argue that in judging an object as beautiful, the initial steps of cognition result in a representation, but we are so 'struck' by this representation that we do not apply a determinate concept to it. Viewed from the non-cognitivist perspective, pre-cognitivists claim that we take pleasure in the cognitive image and not a distinct aesthetic image. A general problem with this view is that if we must go through all the steps of cognition but stop short of applying a determinate concept, why do we not consider all objects beautiful? Pre-cognitivism can entail that all objects must be beautiful, but only if the pre-cognitivist rejects the claim that beauty is 28 relational (3.1). For if this claim is accepted, i.e. that only aesthetically suitable forms of objects are beautiful, then the pre-cognitivist could argue that we are 'struck' by the cognitive image of some objects but not by all. Therefore, pre-cognitivism need not necessarily imply that all objects must be beautiful.
Non-cognitivism avoids the 'all must be beautiful' objection by positing the notion of the aesthetic image. This is the advantage that the non-cognitivist has over the pre-cognitivist. The former can accommodate claim that the imagination is freely active in aesthetic judgement and results in the aesthetic image. In contrast, even if she accepts the relationality claim, the pre-cognitivist reduces the aesthetic image to the cognitive image, and therefore cannot account for the free activity of the imagination in aesthetic judgement.
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The non-cognitive view is of course also incompatible with the multi-cognitive approach. In the latter, an object is perceived as beautiful if the mind takes disinterested pleasure in oscillating between many conceptualizations for it without settling on a determinate one. The non-cognitive view has two advantages over this view. First, the multi-cognitive interpretation of the free play of the faculties in aesthetic judgement as an oscillation of conceptualizations has little textual justification. In addition, the non-cognitivist can offer a textually more grounded interpretation of the notion of free play. The imagination forms the aesthetic image in free play, i.e. through a free creation unhindered by the goal of cognition. Further, the 'free play of the imagination and the understanding' (5: 218) can be seen in terms that are to some extent deflationary. The understanding sets the imagination into 'rule-bound' play (3.3) . Imagination creates the aesthetic image within the confines of the cognitive image and ordinary common sense. This is all there is to free play: imagination and understanding perform roles that they are not free to undertake in the perpetual grind of cognizing. Second, the multi-cognitive interpretation goes against a key Kantian proposition which the non-cognitive interpretation can accommodate. If the representation of the tulip as beautiful must occur in a single representation (3.4) , then aesthetic pleasure must be felt in a single moment of pleasure. Any lingering upon this pleasure (as between oscillations) must succeed this moment. Multi-cognitivists seem to confuse this lingering with aesthetic pleasure itself. However, there is no textual evidence for this claim. 26 Moreover, the non-cognitivist can explain aesthetic pleasure without the oscillation between conceptualizations. Aesthetic pleasure arises when judgement allows the imagination to unify the object-data by way of an aesthetic image. The pleasure is simply the perception of the resulting object; any lingering comes later. 27 Thus, the non-cognitive interpretation has advantages over the multi-cognitive interpretation of the harmony of the faculties.
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Although the non-cognitive interpretation has advantages over the pre-cognitive and multicognitive interpretations, it shares with these approaches the claim that determinate cognition is not required for aesthetic judgement. In contrast, Guyer proposes a meta-cognitive interpretation of the harmony of the faculties. 29 Guyer holds that determinate concepts are indeed applied in aesthetic judgement 'for the simple reason that in both common sense and Kant's epistemology … any judgment about an object already applies some determinate concept to it ' (2006a: 315-16 ). According to Guyer, we say 'That rose is beautiful' not 'That is beautiful', which means that we do apply concepts (here, 'rose') in aesthetic judgements. On the basis of this example, Guyer concludes that 'the free play of our imagination and understanding … must be an experience of unity that seems to us to go beyond whatever sort of unity or organization is entailed by the concept or concepts that we have to apply to the object in order to think or talk about it at all' (2006a: 315-16, 2006b: 178) . He then articulates the 'meta-cognitive' interpretation as follows:
[w]e can, indeed we must be able to have ordinary cognition of the object, but we experience it as beautiful precisely because we experience it as inducing a degree or type of harmony between imagination and understanding -between the manifold it presents and our desire for unity -that goes beyond whatever is necessary for ordinary cognition. (Guyer 2006b: 183) Here 'ordinary cognition', or determinate cognition, is involved in the experience of beauty. An object is beautiful if the imagination harmonizes with the understanding in a way that 'goes beyond' everyday cognition.
With regard to Guyer's controversial meta-cognitive approach, here I simply express agreement with a comment of Malcolm Budd. Guyer argues for the involvement of determinate concepts in aesthetic judgement, because these judgements have the form 'This rose is beautiful' rather than 'This is beautiful'. Budd rightly contends that we can find an object beautiful without knowing what sort of object it is, and we can individuate objects by employing 'just concepts of colour and shape ("That red, yellow and black round thing over there [is beautiful]") ' (2008: 113n.) .
Further, Guyer's argument can be challenged from the non-cognitivist perspective. If we accept NHT, the verbal expression of beauty could be taken to occur after the actual experience of beauty. Words need not be involved when in an aesthetic judgement the faculty of judgement allows the aesthetic image to give form to the encountered object-data, thus enabling the judging subject to take pleasure in it. Since words are unnecessary in this moment, determinate cognition need not occur. Kant certainly never claims that the verbalization of beauty necessarily accompanies the experience of beauty. Therefore, neither the aesthetic image nor the cognitive image of a rose needs to be cognized/verbalized in the actual making of an aesthetic judgement.
However, our pleasure in the aesthetic image can also be cognized/verbalized subsequently as an 'S is P' judgement ('This rose is beautiful'), since the aesthetic image cannot violate the cognitive image, and therefore, like the cognitive image, can be conceptualized as 'rose'.
Finally, the non-cognitive interpretation is textually better grounded than the meta-cognitive interpretation. Guyer (2006b: 183) admits that there is no direct textual evidence for the metacognitive interpretation. Indeed, he says that the best evidence for the meta-cognitive approach is not any particular passage, but that it is 'the only way to make sense of all of Kant's assumptions' (186) . The same could be asserted about the non-cognitive interpretation. But the non-cognitive interpretation is arguably closer to the text, because it accounts for Kant's assertion that in pure aesthetic judgement, the mental faculties are in free play because no 'determinate concept limits them to a specific rule of cognition' (5: 217).
Still, the question of whether the non-cognitive or the meta-cognitive interpretation fits better with Kant's overall system admittedly requires further investigation. In terms of the NHT vocabulary, the choice between them revolves around two textual/philosophical questions. 
